## Anonymity in the Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer Network

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### Why do People Use Cryptocurrencies?

**Currency Stability** 



Investment



Technical Properties/ Ideology



### "Untraceable Bitcoin"


### Teenagers using untraceable currency Bitcoin to buy dangerous drugs online

Fears have been raised as children as young as 14 are getting parcels of legal highs delivered to their home






### This is false.



### How can users be deanonymized?




Entire transaction histories can be compromised.

### What about the peer-to-peer network?

Public Key ← IP Address


### Our Work

### **Analysis**



Pr(detection)


#### Redesign




Dandelion

### Model


Assumptions and Notation




### Attacks on the Network Layer




### What can go wrong?




### What the eavesdropper can do about it



### Summary of adversarial model






### Analysis

How bad is the problem?




### Flooding Protocols

Trickle (pre-2015)



Diffusion (post-2015)




## Does diffusion provide stronger anonymity than trickle spreading?


### d-regular trees

Fraction of spies p = 1


Arbitrary number of connections  $\theta$ 



### Anonymity Metric $P(\text{detection}|\dot{\tau}, G)$




$$oldsymbol{ au} = egin{bmatrix} au_1 \\ au_2 \\ au_1 \\ au_n \end{bmatrix}$$



### **Estimators**


## $P(\text{detection}|\boldsymbol{\tau},G)$




### Results: d-Regular Trees

	Trickle	Diffusion
First-Timestamp	$O\left(\frac{\log d}{d}\right)$	$O\left(\frac{\log d}{d}\right)$
Maximum-Likelihood	$\Omega(1)$	$\Omega(1)$


Intuition: Symmetry outweighs local randomness!




## Proof sketch (diffusion, max likelihood)



### Results: Trees



### Results: Bitcoin Graph




# Diffusion does not have (significantly) better anonymity properties than trickle.

### Redesign

Can we design a better network?





### Botnet adversarial model



### Metric for Anonymity

#### Recall





**Precision** 

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{v} \frac{1\{M(v's tx) = v\}}{\text{# tx mapped to v}}$$


E[Recall] =
Probability of Detection

Mapping M

### Goal:


Design a distributed flooding protocol that minimizes the maximum precision and recall achievable by a computationally-unbounded adversary.

### **Fundamental Limits**




### What are we looking for?

### **Asymmetry**



### **Mixing**



### What can we control?

### **Spreading Topology Dynamicity Protocol** Approximately Dynamic Diffusion regular Static

Given a graph, how do we spread content?

What is the underlying graph topology?

How often does the graph change?

### Spreading Protocol: Dandelion 2) Spreading Phase 1) Anonymity Phase

### Why Dandelion spreading?

Theorem: Dandelion spreading has an


optimally low maximum recall of  $p + O\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$ .

lower bound = p

fraction of spies


number of nodes

### Graph Topology: Line




### Dynamicity: High

Change the anonymity graph frequently.




#### Dandelion Network Policy

## Spreading Protocol




Given a graph, how do we spread content?

#### **Topology**



What is the anonymity graph topology?

#### **Dynamicity**



How often does the graph change?


lower bound =  $p^2$ 

Theorem: DANDELION has a nearly-optimal

maximum precision of 
$$\frac{2p^2}{1-p}\log\left(\frac{2}{p}\right) + O\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)$$
.\*


fraction number of of spies nodes

### Performance: Achievable Region




#### Why does DANDELION work?

Strong mixing properties.



Precision: O(p)


#### **Complete graph**




Precision:  $\frac{p}{1-p}(1-e^{p-1})$ 


# How practical is this?

### Dandelion spreading



### Anonymity graph construction





#### Dealing with stronger adversaries

Learn the graph

Misbehave during graph construction

Misbehave during propagation








4-regular graphs


Only send messages on outgoing edges

Multiple nodes diffuse

### Anonymity graph construction




#### Latency Overhead: Estimate



Information Propagation in the Bitcoin Network, Decker and Wattenhofer, 2013


### Deployment considerations





#### Why not alternative solutions?

**Connect through Tor** 

**I2P Integration (e.g. Monero)** 








### Take-Home Messages


- 1) Bitcoin's P2P network has poor anonymity.
- 2) Moving from trickle to diffusion did not help.
- 3) Dandelion may be a lightweight solution for certain classes of adversaries.


https://github.com/gfanti/bitcoin

#### DANDELION vs. Tor, Crowds, etc.




- 1) Messages propagate over the **same** cycle graph
- 2) Anonymity graph changes dynamically.
- 3) No encryption required.





### Anonymity graph construction



**Base Case** 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.6 k=1 **Rounds** 0.2 0.1 0.0

Degree

#### Dealing with stronger adversaries

Learn the graph

Misbehave during graph construction

Misbehave during propagation








4-regular graphs


Get rid of degree-checking

Multiple nodes diffuse

### Learning the anonymity graph




### Manipulating the anonymity graph




#### Dandelion++ Network Policy

# Spreading Protocol




Given a graph, how do we spread content?

#### **Topology**



What is the anonymity graph topology?

#### **Dynamicity**



How often does the graph change?